A balance of rights and protections in public order policing: A case study on Rotherham by Grace, Jamie
A balance of rights and protections in public order 
policing: A case study on Rotherham
GRACE, Jamie <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8862-0014>
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/19069/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
GRACE, Jamie (2018). A balance of rights and protections in public order policing: A 
case study on Rotherham. European Journal of Current Legal Issues, 24 (1). 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
  
A balance of rights and protections in public order policing: A case study on 
Rotherham 
Abstract 
This article aims to discuss the difficult policing position of attempting to facilitate legitimate 
political protest; whilst planning to protect the public from harm arising from risk of violent 
protest. A kind of case study is undertaken, from this perspective, of public order policing 
challenges faced by South Yorkshire Police in Rotherham and elsewhere in that region, given 
the attention that the town and area have garnered from far-right protest groups such as the 
English Defence League and Britain First. Particular examination is given to the legal 
challenges inherent in public order policing, where the rights to lawful freedom of 
expressions and association for protesting groups must be balanced, in the view of the UK 
courts, with the rights to private and family life for members of the local community, in the 
face of what can sometimes boil over to become violent bigotry and racism.  
The situation concerning public order policing in Rotherham in the last several years is 
worthy of a case study-type article such as this one for several reasons. Unique political 
innovations in the form of an advisory panel on protests have been created by the politicised 
office of the police and crime commissioner, following an uncompromising approach from 
the Home Office to reject calls for reform of the Public Order Act 1986. Meanwhile, the 
targeting of the area by far-right protesters is unlikely to cease until more accountability is 
forthcoming over the appalling record of public bodies in failing to address child sexual 
exploitation in Rotherham. Lastly, case law developments that have occurred in 2017 allow 
us to take an opportunity to revisit the legal framework that police commanders in Rotherham 
must negotiate in facilitating protests in the town. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2009, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) released a pair of highly 
influential and transformative reports on public order policing in the UK, following a number 
of notoriously heavy-handed police operations, including the killing of Ian Tomlinson during 
the policing of the London G20 protest in 2009
1
. 
The first of these reports, Adapting to Protest, in the words of one of its chief authors, Jane 
Gordon, "analysed the relationship between the human rights obligations of the police and 
their public order powers", and "sought to introduce an explicitly human rights based 
approach to the policing of protest, defining the starting point for the policing of protest as a 
presumption in favour of facilitating peaceful protest, reflecting the obligations of the police 
under [the European Convention on Human Rights]".
2
 
Since the landmark Adapting to Protest reports, British policing of public order and of protest 
has been rightly put under the spotlight to a greater degree than prior to this period. HMIC in 
2009, in their second landmark report of that year (Adapting to Protest - Nurturing the British 
model of policing
3
), noted that: 
"Adapting to Protest highlighted confusion regarding the legal framework for the 
policing of protest, in particular the human rights obligations of the police under 
Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly. It identified the starting point for policing protest as 
the presumption in favour of facilitating peaceful protest. However, this is not an 
absolute presumption."
4
 
Such rejoinders about the guarantees for the right to peaceful protest have to be re-issued 
from time to time; since periodically, the police, in particular hotspots across the UK, must in 
practice put a balance of  obligations to facilitate peaceful expression and assembly, as 
against the duty to protect members of the public from harm, to the test. As Lockley and 
Ismail have observed in a report on the policing of recent far-right protests in South 
Yorkshire: 
"The right of protest is enshrined in the common law of England and Wales. It is also 
protected by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The police have 
powers to place conditions on marches and assemblies, and in certain circumstances, 
to seek to have a march prohibited. Despite the law’s protection of the right to protest, 
that right is not unqualified. Art 11 of the ECHR – embedded in the law of the United 
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Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998 – allows certain restrictions to be placed on 
freedom of assembly, if necessary in a democratic society (among other 
circumstances) in the interests of public safety, the prevention of disorder and crime 
and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Additionally, Art 10 protects 
freedom of expression, and this too is a qualified right, subject to broadly the same 
restrictions as Art 11."
5
 
HMIC in 2009, again in their follow-up report Adapting to Protest report, also noted that:  
"ECHR Articles 9, 10 and 11 protect the right to manifest a religion [and other beliefs], to 
freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly respectively. Taken together, 
they provide a right of protest. The right to freedom of peaceful assembly
 
under ECHR 
Article 11 places both negative and positive obligations on the police. The police must 
not prevent or restrict peaceful protest except to the extent allowed by ECHR Article 
11 (2)…"6 
Furthermore, HMIC also noted that it had "become clear that a number of police forces in 
England and Wales approach peaceful protest in terms of “is the protest lawful or 
unlawful?”"7. This was rejected as an "incorrect starting point" since the "concept of 
‘unlawful protest’ is inaccurate as a matter of law":  
"Firstly, there is no legal basis in domestic law for describing a public protest as 
inherently unlawful: the common law offence of unlawful assembly was explicitly 
abolished under section 9 of the Public Order Act 1986 and neither the Public Order 
Act 1986 nor the law on obstruction of the highway renders a protest in and of itself 
unlawful. Secondly, the right guaranteed by ECHR Article 11 is the right to “peaceful 
assembly”, not “lawful assembly”. By definition, a person who is exercising the right 
in ECHR Article 11 to peaceful assembly is acting lawfully. In fact, it is unlawful 
under the Human Rights Act for a public authority, including the police, to act in a 
way which is incompatible with that right.
 
But the police will not be acting in a way 
which is incompatible with the right if they act in accordance with the requirements of 
Article 11(2)."
8
 
Much more recently, however, there have been some judicial reminders of the need to place 
public protection and the reduction of the risk of harm to bystanders and a local community 
back at the heart of the debate on public order policing. Duties on the police arise from the 
common law as well as 'counter-obligations', that is, rival positive obligations, under human 
rights law, to the positive obligations to facilitate protest. Lady Hale in Michael v Chief 
Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2 observed at 195: 
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"There is no doubt that the police owe a positive duty in public law to protect 
members of the public from harm caused by third parties… the police have a duty to 
take all steps which appear necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime and 
for protecting from criminal injury… a party threatened with violence from another is 
entitled to protection, whatever the rights and wrong of their dispute." 
There is then the question as to whether an interference with any right to protest, such as this 
is continued in the package of rights in Articles 9, 10 and 11 ECHR, is to be undertaken by 
the police as a careful and proportionate balancing exercise between those particular rights, as 
a kind of set, and the positive obligation that exists under the qualified right to respect for 
private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. Lord Kerr recently observed in R (DB) v 
Police Service of Northern Ireland [2017] UKSC 7 at para. 75 that "proportionality has 
certainly a role to play in assessing whether police actions have fulfilled their positive 
obligation to protect the [community's] article 8 rights". The issue is that correctly judging the 
proportionality of the approaches used in the management of a protest, and its hopefully 
peaceful facilitation, through to and including any need arising to bring a dangerously 
disorderly protest (or element of a protest) to an end is a difficult job for police commanders 
to undertake. Judicial approaches to the question of balancing rights to protest (in a kind of 
package of ECHR rights) and duties to protect the public result in a mixed bag of public 
protest jurisprudence.  
David Mead observed in 2010 that the case law at that time portrayed "a picture of protest 
that is very mixed": 
"It is impossible to sum up succinctly or even confidently to set out its direction and 
trends… This really is the problem. There is little by way of an overarching scheme or 
an underpinning theory [of peaceful protest in England and Wales]… If we were to 
attempt mathematically to depict 'protest in 2010', the case law trend would be, at best, 
no change and would probably evince a subtle regressive shift [away from rights to 
peaceful protest in England and Wales]."
9
 
This article aims to discuss the difficult policing position of attempting to facilitate legitimate 
political protest whilst protecting the public from harm arising from unlawful or violent 
protest. A kind of case study is undertaken, from this perspective, of public order policing 
challenges faced by South Yorkshire Police in Rotherham and elsewhere in that region, given 
the attention that the town and area have garnered from far-right protest groups such as the 
English Defence League and Britain First. Particular examination is given to the legal 
challenges inherent in public order policing, where the rights to lawful freedom of 
expressions and association for protesting groups must be balanced, in the view of the UK 
courts, with the rights to private and family life for members of the local community, in the 
face of what can sometimes boil over to become unlawful and violent bigotry and racism.  
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2. The public order policing context in Rotherham 
Rotherham is arguably on the radar of UK public consciousness for one main reason: the 
mass sexual exploitation of children that went on there for a number of years
10
, with little or 
nothing done by the regional police force (South Yorkshire Police, or SYP), or the local 
government authority (Rotherham Borough Council, or RBC), to take measures to prevent 
this from occurring at the time (that is, chiefly in 1997-2003)
11
. Publicly, such widespread 
child sexual exploitation (CSE) was a little known-about issue
12
, yet one of the gravest 
seriousness, until matters increasingly came to light in the late Noughties and up to a point 
earlier this decade
13
. Since then, and because of the considerable media reporting that has 
focused on the Asian ethnicity and Muslim religious affiliation of many of those known 
perpetrators who were eventually prosecuted
14
, far-right groups from across the UK have 
periodically descended upon Rotherham, Sheffield and other towns
15
 in order to agitate their 
political causes. These self-same causes can be challenged as racist, xenophobic, and 
Islamophobic
16
. Repeated protests in Rotherham by such groups as the English Defence 
League (EDL) and Britain First (BF) have been the scenes of considerable violence, and have 
taken place at considerable cost to the taxpayer, local business, and more importantly, at 
times, the safety and wellbeing of the local community
17
. The strength of feeling for far-right 
protests might be on the wane in, say, London
18
 - even recently, in the aftermath of the first 
deadly terrorist attacks in the UK capital for several years
19
.  
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The mood (and the violence) of many protests and demonstrations in Rotherham (and other 
towns and cities) in the period since 2012 has been exacerbated by the presence not just of far 
right groups, such as the EDL, but anti-fascist groups with a militant, far-left and sometimes 
violent contingent
20
; while the group Unite Against Fascism (UAF) can simply mobilise 
larger numbers of counter-protestors that require careful policing
21
. Thousands of police 
officers can be required to police a single large demonstration by the EDL in Rotherham, 
since it can and does draw a large counter-demonstration from UAF - resulting in violent 
conflict and numerous public order offences being committed, and multiple arrests to be 
made by South Yorkshire Police
22
. 
Local residents can be targeted by the far-right groups, or caught up in violence caused by the 
far-right protests. It could be argued that this a more likely consequence of those protests 
simply being allowed to take place as compared to protests by other groups with less 
unsavoury agendas. However, the police control and regulation of protest must take place in 
fulfilment of the logical and legal assertion that despite their unsavoury politics, the (more 
peaceful) members of the EDL and other groups, prima facie, must enjoy their qualified 
rights to freedom of assembly and association to the extent that the Public Order Act 1986 
allows, as it is to be interpreted in the light of the ECHR. However, the treading of that line 
between the facilitation of public protest under positive obligations arising from the ECHR, 
and ensuring an emphasis and high regard for community safety, under both common law 
and statutory duties (and the ECHR), is not easy for South Yorkshire police to perform - nor 
would it be for any police force
23
. Politically, however, SYP must operate in relation to 
public order policing against not only background of failures in relation to CSE in 
Rotherham; but also cover-ups in relation to the Hillsborough disaster
24
, and a growing 
political storm over the failure by the Home Office to launch a public inquiry into the 
wrongdoings of police participants in the so-called 'Battle of Orgreave'
252627
. 
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Today, South Yorkshire Police and the local Police and Crime Commissioner certainly 
expect the far-right to continue to exploit their traction in the region, and in Rotherham in 
particular
28
. Meanwhile, hate crime incidents have been on the rise in the UK following an 
inflammatory vote for 'Brexit' in June 2016
29
. This violent protest narrative is arguably 
matched and extended by the rise of far-right street groups and associated violent protest in 
other parts of Europe, outside of the UK
30
. Broadly speaking, in other European countries it is 
the same human rights law framework, in the form of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (the ECHR), which structures and regulates 
approaches to public order policing from a human rights perspective, and under the auspices 
of the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. Chief amongst the relevant Articles of 
the ECHR in this context are Articles 10 and 11, the qualified rights to freedom of expression 
and freedom of association respectively.  
It may be that unsavoury and unwelcome protest, including far-right and neo-fascist protest, 
can be engaged with and better understood by police forces who seek to build rapport, as a 
particular strategy, with those more widely unwelcome protestors, such as the EDL. Gorringe 
and Rosie have observed that 'once even ‘transgressive’ protestors are conceived of as 
rational actors who can be negotiated with rather than feared, then possibilities for dialogue 
open up’31. 
In a current policy climate of the 'facilitation of protest' however, far-right groups in locations 
across the UK have begun to afflict local communities - even if, once such protests by groups 
like the EDL become disorderly, they are then heavily policed, and physically and spatially 
controlled. Stott et al have observed that ‘the police invariably start their planning from a 
position of negotiated management – not least of all because they are [legally] obliged to do 
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so… escalated force or strategic incapacitation [are possible] if police perceive the levels of 
threat, potential for criminality and disruption warrant this’32. 
Stott et al conclude, however, that ‘interventions increase the risk [that] police will also 
infringe rights of peaceful assembly protected under the HRA’33. It is of course a vital 
element of police legitimacy, based on the theory 'policing by consent' that predominates in 
the UK context, that public protest is policed impartially, and in a politically neutral 
manner
34
; that is to say, based around harm reduction, public safety and the maintenance of 
the peace. The chief text informing this exercise in striking a balance between competing 
responsibilities to uphold positive obligations around public safety and freedom to protest is 
the Public Order Act 1986, as read in conjunction with the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. 
3. Articles 10 and 11 ECHR and the important issue of proportionality 
Articles 10 and 11 have a commonality of structure. They are both qualified rights as part of 
the ECHR, and interferences with them must be legitimate (in the sense that those 
interferences must be 'prescribed by law'), necessary (with interferences responding to a 
recognised 'pressing social need') and proportionate (entailing a 'fair balance' between the 
impact on the rights of individuals, and the resulting benefits to society as a whole a result, 
here, of any restriction of the right to freedom of expression or association).  
Lord Rodger in R. (on the application of Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire 
[2006] UKHL 55 at para. 85, on the issue of such qualified ECHR rights and the concept of 
proportionality, that: 
"To be permissible, any restriction on these essential rights in articles 10 and 11 must 
be necessary in a democratic society. The proportionality principle demands that a 
balance be struck between the requirements of the purposes listed in articles 10(2) and 
11(2) and the freedom to express opinions and to assemble." 
As was noted in the introduction to this piece, judging the proportionality of policing 
approaches to regulating protest is difficult in demanding circumstances. Issues around police 
resource pressures, fluid or partial police intelligence and the pressures of local politics might 
all be contextual distractions from purer human rights law considerations of the application of 
ECHR rights to the decision-making for police commanders. 
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Interferences with the rights of protestors can be justified according to particular aims 
including the prevention of crime and disorder (the most relevant in our context here, in 
Rotherham and in public order policing in general). However, in controlling and regulating 
public protest, it will be argued below, there has been fresh emphasis for the police in the UK, 
and in South Yorkshire, on the positive obligation not just placed upon them to facilitate 
protest under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, but the positive obligation placed upon them by 
Article 8 of the ECHR to uphold the right to respect for private and family life of the local 
community; as highlighted for them by the UK Supreme Court in the recent case of DB
35
. 
However, prior to this recent case law development came particular political innovations, 
which have shed light on the determination of the regional policing authorities in South 
Yorkshire to counter and combat the impact of far-right protests (and left-wing counter-
protests) on the local community. 
4. Innovation in seeking to maintain public order in Rotherham 
In late February 2017, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that "Since 2012, 
16 protests have been held [in Rotherham], the majority organized by far right groups such as 
the EDL and Britain First, at a cost of £4m…"36 It transpires that in 2015 the Police and 
Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire (SYPCC) had written to the Home Office, as the 
responsible department for policing matters in the UK national government, arguing for 
reforms to the legislation which chiefly regulates public protest and public order policing in 
England and Wales (the Public Order Act 1986), but the Home Office reportedly "said it had 
no current plans to change the law."
37
  
In a pragmatic move, it could be argued, to be seen to be taking action against the far-right 
protests affecting the sense of community in Rotherham, an independent report 
commissioned by the SYPCC, Dr. Alan Billings, recommended that a Rotherham Advisory 
Panel for Protests be created. This Panel would, it was thought, be able to offer input on the 
policing of assemblies and processions in Rotherham in spring 2016 onwards. The report 
recommended specifically that "…the PCC should establish an Advisory Panel for 
Protests…[though] such a panel would have no statutory powers, and, for example, could not 
itself impose or prohibit marching routes."
 38
  
But in practice, and as the relevant report further details, the Panel is likely to have a distinct 
procedural impact on the nature of the policing of protest in Rotherham and across South 
Yorkshire: 
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"As soon as the police become aware that a protest event is being organised, the Panel 
should have a prompt meeting. Speed is of the essence. We envisage that the police 
will present proposals for handling the protest, and that the Panel will then comment. 
Ultimately, decisions on operational matters are of course for the police to make and 
be accountable for. The Panel will need to respect the operational independence of the 
Chief Constable at all times. However, the aim will be that police decisions are made 
with the benefit of advice from the Panel."
 39
  
The report also noted that the situation on the ground in Rotherham warranted creating such a 
panel, and in so doing, consciously borrowed a practice from Northern Ireland, with its 
(statutory) Parades Commission. Lockley and Ismail have observed that: 
"Unlike the Parades Commission of Northern Ireland (‘PCNI’), such a panel would have 
no statutory powers, and, for example, could not itself impose or prohibit marching routes. 
But we readily acknowledge the contribution made to our thinking by the success of the 
PCNI, and the input obtained from a past chair, Sir Anthony Holland."40  
 
An Independent Policing Protests Advisory Panel ('the Panel') was duly announced and put 
into action by the PCC for South Yorkshire in March 2016
41
. SYPCC Alan Billings noted, 
upon the launch of the Panel, that:  
“The members that have been appointed represent a cross-section of our communities 
from across South Yorkshire and I expect them to be able to bring knowledge and 
expertise to make recommendations regardless of the objective of the planned 
protests… For some time now there have been a number of protestors travelling 
regularly to Rotherham to protest against the Force’s handling of child sexual 
exploitation matters. Last Saturday members of the Panel assisted with the 
arrangements for the EDL protest for the first time. In the future we don’t know what 
issues might be the subject of protests or where they might be in the county. This new 
panel with its diverse membership should be able to assist and advise when 
necessary.”42 
However, it could be argued that as the panel, as reported, has an influence over the 
operational handling by South Yorkshire Police of far-right protests in Rotherham, then there 
is a danger of complaints, accusations and even legal challenges on the grounds of bias in 
relation to the role of the Panel - since it does not, however understandably, feature a 
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designated representative of the far-right. Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 sets down the 
current test for 'apparent bias' as a ground of judicial review, however, as whether a fair 
minded and informed observer would conclude there was a real possibility of bias. But in 
response to this criticism, it must be noted that the SYPCC and South Yorkshire Police are in 
a particular position on the issue of policy in terms of protest management from a wider 
equality law perspective. In any area of England and Wales, the police and the PCC, as well 
as a local authority, are under duties under the public sector equality duty (PSED). Race and 
religion, for example, are 'protected characteristics' under S.149(7) of the Equality Act 2010. 
Section 149(1) of the 2010 Act contains the essence of the PSED, as follows: 
"149 (1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to 
the need to— 
(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is 
prohibited by or under this Act; 
(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and persons who do not share it; 
(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic 
and persons who do not share it." 
 Clearly, on just one strand of the PSED for example, the Rotherham Panel would potentially 
be seen as a means by which, in South Yorkshire, the PCC and the police are evidencing the 
meeting their duty to have due regard to, amongst other things, better fostering of 'good 
relations' between communities in the town of Rotherham, by perhaps taking the feeling of 
non-involvement of the local community perspective out of the equation. 
Having noted this, when  it comes to the membership of the Panel itself, though, it must be 
said that a better model, from a democratic accountability point of view, would be a Panel 
made up of a number of elected local councillors, as well as other public figures in the area.  
Such a higher profile elected contingent of Panel membership would bring the PCC, SYP and 
the local authorities of South Yorkshire together in a more visible way that could be very 
effective and more democratically legitimate. By way of analogy, an issue currently is that 
the Panel (and others like it in time perhaps) has a lot more in common in terms of its 
membership with the role ‘special advisors’ in central government.  
There is too the fundamental question as to whether the courts already provide enough ‘steer' 
in the form of case law that police commanders in public order scenarios could be better or 
more thoroughly trained to navigate and to apply. 
However, if such 'Advisory Panels on Protest' proliferated in other parts of the UK, there is a 
risk that newer criticisms of the further politicisation of public order policing, and of any 
procedural omission of right-of-centre views, would join other wider criticisms about the 
stifled nature of public protect in the UK. For example, Joanna Gilmore, in her 
comprehensive 2013 doctoral study of large parts of the UK legal framework regulating 
protest, has noted that there is ‘an extensive legal regime that places onerous restrictions on 
  
the activities of protestors’43. For this reason alone it is hoped that the Panel in Rotherham 
remains a special case, just as in some ways the strength of far-right protest in Rotherham in 
recent years has been a special case. Or perhaps such panels could at the very least be put on 
a statutory basis in time, with strict duties to consider a wide range of membership. 
Certainly, one thing that the equivalent legal framework would struggle with in any 
jurisdiction is the ability to meaningfully, and without prejudice, articulate balanced and 
proportionate restrictions on protest regardless of how unsavoury or unwholesome the 
relevant causes and politics of demonstrators might be. This is vital since, as many would 
agree, a culture of effective but not harmful protest should be seen as a sign of healthy 
democratic values under the rule of law, with any violence occurring as part of protest then 
falling within the ambit of the criminal law as much as the law regulating civil liberties. 
5. The framework of the Public Order Act 1986 in the light of the qualified rights to 
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly 
As outlined above, case law on public order policing is driven by the balance between human 
rights duties and obligations to facilitate peaceful protest in the forms of processions and 
assemblies, and competing duties and obligations to keep the public date and prevent the 
disproportionate, imbalanced interference with the right to respect for private life, and other 
rights of individuals in a community where a protest may take place. A core piece of 
regulatory statute in this set-piece is the Public Order Act 1986. 
In considering the legal framework of protests and marches, it must first be noted that there is 
a statutory requirement of advance notice of '6 clear days' for public processions, that is, 
marches and mobile demonstrations in a local authority area, under Section 11 of the Public 
Order Act 1986. This requirement does not apply to regular, repeated processions that take 
place using a similar route and format (S.11(2)), however; although it must be said that the 
far-right protests in Rotherham have not been so regularly present ('commonly or customarily 
held') in the town that this principle from the 1986 Act would apply to them. Kay v 
Metropolitan Police [2008] UKHL 69 concerned a procession in the form of a large scale 
cycle ride through central London that took place each month for years, with the same 
starting location, but very little else in common from one occurrence of the event to another. 
Importantly, with the House of Lords finding in Kay that there was no duty on any person to 
notify under Section 11 of the 1986 Act, the example of this 'Critical Mass' cycle ride can be 
distinguished from far-right marches in Rotherham. 'Critical Mass' had no leadership 
structure or chief organisers as such, and so nobody was identifiable as being under the 
notification duty in Section 11; while far-right groups such as Britain First adopt hierarchical 
structures as a matter of course
44
. So the requirement that exists for the far-right to give 
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notices of their marches in Rotherham ensures that the regulation and control of the 
procession concerned should in theory always be possible to undertake in a carefully planned 
manner, albeit with the new influence of the Rotherham Advisory Panel on Protests, as 
described above. 
The second HMIC Adapting to Protest report from 2009 has it too that police intelligence 
should be used to plan the management of a protest where there is no notification under 
Section 11 of the 1986 Act: 
"Where police have prior information that an event is due to take place (even though 
formal notification has not been provided), they should take appropriate measures to 
plan and prepare for the event… Police must have information or intelligence that the 
protest group represents a danger to public order or public safety before imposing any 
conditions on a peaceful protest or taking steps to disperse the protest."  
As a key regulatory power for the police under the Public Order Act 1986, Section 12(1) 
allows for imposing conditions on public processions, as follows: 
"(1) If the senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which and the 
circumstances in which any public procession is being held or is intended to be held 
and to its route or proposed route, reasonably believes that— 
(a) it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious 
disruption to the life of the community, or 
(b) the purpose of the persons organising it is the intimidation of others with a view to 
compelling them not to do an act they have a right to do, or to do an act they have a 
right not to do, 
he may give directions imposing on the persons organising or taking part in the 
procession such conditions as appear to him necessary to prevent such disorder, 
damage, disruption or intimidation, including conditions as to the route of the 
procession or prohibiting it from entering any public place..." 
Following R (Brehony) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2005] EWHC 640 
(Admin), the rationale for imposing conditions (under the headings above) must be stipulated 
by a police commander in imposing those conditions and restrictions on a protest. 
Importantly, breaches of these conditions placed on processions by the police can lead to the 
commission of criminal offences by demonstrators
45
; aside from more violent offences they 
may commit as a result of disorderly and harmful protest
46
. Furthermore, under Section 13 of 
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the 1986 Act, public processions may be prohibited in a council area for up to three months, 
with the consent of the Home Secretary and the relevant local authority, if the kind of 
conditions above would not be sufficient to maintain public order. This approach was initially 
tried by South Yorkshire Police, together with the Police and Crime Commissioner for South 
Yorkshire, and Rotherham Borough Council, in relation to the far-right protests in Rotherham 
and across the region of late. As Thirlaway has noted, despite these "requests from 
Rotherham Council and the Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire, the Home 
Secretary declined to approve a ban under s13, opting instead to provide a special grant of 
funding to meet the costs of policing "
47
. In due course these continuing protests prompted 
their request to the Home Office that the 1986 Act be reformed, and, with no government 
interest in that proposal, to set up the Rotherham Advisory Panel on Protests, as noted above. 
As an important overall balancing protection for the rights to freedom of expression and 
association under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, given the extent to which the nature of the 
provisions of the 1986 Act interferes with them, Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 
entails that directions may only be given by the police as to the duration and nature (location 
and size) of assemblies, should the relevant conditions concerning risk be satisfied, as above; 
and assemblies, importantly, cannot be prohibited outright. As noted above, there had been a 
November 2015 report by SYPCC (and their Independent Policing Ethics Panel) that had 
been sent to the Home Office, to communicate a request to consider statutory reform of the 
Public Order Act 1986. The SYPCC report in November 2015 highlighted that there were 
already very large costs of policing protests in Rotherham, by that time, but expressly, it 
would seem, the 2015 report rejected the idea that costs alone could be the basis of 
preventing otherwise lawful protests. 
There was, however, a list of factors that the SYPCC felt that the Home Office might allow 
the police force in any given area the lawful ability under the Public Order Act 1986 to take 
into account, through statutory reform, however. In summary, these were the repetitive nature 
of protests; the seriousness of impact on community relationships and local businesses, and 
(although only if there were another criterion present, it was argued by the report) 
disproportionate costs
48
. The SYPCC recommendation to Home Office was that 
disproportionate costs would need to be joined by one of the other factors that were relevant, 
including the existing ones from the Public Order Act 1986 framework, which include 
intimidation, and ' serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption 
to the life of the community..'. This argument was rejected by the Home Office only in 
February 2017.  
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6. Newer legal powers and case law developments 
Such fresh language and perspective in the Public Order Act 1986 may not be in current 
government plans, but there has been, in the last few years, a shift in the powers that can be 
deployed by the police under statute to help them control and regulate potentially violent 
protest and protestors. For example, Sections 34 - 42 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 concern dispersal order powers, to be used on the authorisation of a 
senior police officer (Section 34(2)): 
"only if satisfied on reasonable grounds that the use of those powers in the locality 
during that period may be necessary for the purpose of removing or reducing the 
likelihood of— 
(a) members of the public in the locality being harassed, alarmed or distressed, or 
(b) the occurrence in the locality of crime or disorder. 
Breach of a dispersal order, by an individual given such a direction is a criminal offence 
under Section 39 of the 2014 Act.  
In R (Singh) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2006] EWCA Civ 1118, concerning 
a protest about a theatre production some deemed offensive, Lady Justice Hallett observed (at 
para. 58), in dealing with the previous statutory regime for police dispersal powers, that the 
"right to protest becomes effectively worthless if the protesters' choice of "when and where" 
to protest is not respected as far as possible…". The earlier statutory regime had excluded 
processions, but not assemblies, from the ambit of the police dispersal powers. Hallett LJ also 
noted (in Singh at para. 87) that the older statutory regime of dispersal powers could not be 
used by a police officer,  
"unless he or she has reasonable grounds for believing that any members of the public 
have been intimidated, harassed, alarmed or distressed or are likely to be. There is in 
this situation an urgency of a kind not dealt with in sections 12 and 14 of the Public 
Order Act. Accordingly, in my view, the powers under s.30 must be seen as 
complementary to the powers in the Public Order Act and they are not inconsistent 
with them." 
However, the new dispersal powers regime in Sections 34 - 42 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014 contain a controversial point about the exemptions from the use 
of the dispersal orders powers themselves. Section 36 of the 2014 entails that a police officer 
may not give a direction to disperse to a person who is either lawfully picketing or who is 
part of a notified procession for the purposes of Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986, or 
where it was not reasonably practicable to give such written notice, or the procession is one 
commonly or customarily held. Non-notified processions, where it was reasonably 
practicable to give notice or which are not commonly or customarily held in the area can thus 
be subject to a dispersal direction given by a police officer. While Section 34 of the 2014 
requires a senior police officer of the rank of inspector or above to have given the 
authorisation for the dispersal order and directions to be used, while having "particular regard 
to the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly set out in articles 10 and 11 
  
of the Convention", given the interpretive function of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 
1998 this language must also be read with regard to the positive obligation to protect the right 
to respect for private and family life of individuals in the local community. So a decision-
making factor such as the non-notification of a public procession, which HMIC took pains to 
downplay as a legitimate police concern in their Adapting to Protest reports in 20090, can 
still arguably, lawfully interact in the minds of police commanders with the issue of the 
threshold for the use of dispersal order powers to prevent or preclude (a) members of the 
public in the locality being harassed, alarmed or distressed, or (b) the occurrence in the 
locality of crime or disorder. 
In addition to these dispersal powers, as Vicky Thirlaway has highlighted, in discussing the 
decision in Chief Constable of Bedfordshire v Golding [2015] EWHC 1875 (QB), that the 
2014 Act also "makes provision for the grant of civil injunctions against persons who have 
engaged, or who threaten to engage, in anti-social behaviour"
49
. In Golding, the court struck a 
balance between the need to protect the safety of Muslim members of the community in 
Luton, in the face of a protest by Britain First, with a need to protect and facilitate the protest 
of that far-right group itself. This need for a balanced approach led to injunctions against so-
called 'mosque invasions'; against distributing materials likely to stir up racial hatred; against 
causing harassment, alarm or distress to any person through the use of threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour; and an injunction, lastly, against the carrying of banners or 
signs worded 'No more Mosques' or similarly in Luton on the day of the protest. But there 
were no injunctions against the leadership of Britain First from entering Luton and taking part 
in the protest they had organised.
50
 As Mr Justice Knowles explained in obiter in Golding (at 
para. 37) that when dealing with extremist views: "all must strive not to inhibit the freedom to 
express views, the freedom to demonstrate and the freedom to organise politically. Indeed it 
is sometimes through allowing views to be heard, that error in views can be exposed. And it 
is sometimes through allowing the opportunity for support to be shown, that lack of support 
can be exposed." 
In addition to the structure for regulation of public protest that is created by statutory 
processes for creating conditions on processions and assemblies; for allowing the potential 
deployment of dispersal order 'zones'; and the use of targeted civil injunctions precluding 
more inflammatory elements of a protest, there is still a vital range of contributions to public 
order policing made by 'residual' common law powers that contribute to the policing of 
protest and public order. There is, for example, under the common law a considerable scope 
for the retention of police intelligence on protestors, as used to calculate approaches to 
policing protest groups, as afforded by the decision by the UK Supreme Court in Catt in 
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2015
51
. However, the most vital parts of the common law dimension of the framework for 
public order policing ensure that arrests and actions short of arrest can be used to stop, curtail 
or prevent a breach of the peace so long as the relevant legal conditions are met, of course.  
These conditions in the common law are amply described in R (McClure and Moos) v 
Metropolitan Police [2012] EWCA Civ 12, a case about the containment of two large groups 
of several thousand demonstrators on the streets of central London, and where only one of the 
two groups had actually become disorderly - since there was a concern on the part of 
Metropolitan police commanders that if the two groups met on their march, as had been 
initially planned, there would be even greater disorder in the spread of violent behaviour from 
the one group to the other, more peaceable one. And so both groups were thus contained or 
'kettled' to a standstill for several hours by the police - giving rise to a judicial review 
challenge to the lawfulness of the police approach on the day in question.  
According to Lord Neuberger in the Court of Appeal in McClure and Moos, an apprehended 
breach of the peace must firstly be imminent i.e. likely to happen; while the concept and the 
nature of 'imminence' itself, of course, depends upon the exact circumstances facing the 
police at the time the relevant decision is taken. If steps such as arrests for breach of the 
peace or containment, as an actions short of arrest, are to be justified, they must be necessary 
(i.e. only in extreme and exceptional circumstances), as well as reasonable and proportionate. 
With specific reference to the police tactics under scrutiny, in McClure and Moos the Court 
of Appeal found that the prolonged separation of assembled groups or processions (one of 
which may be protesting much more peacefully than the other) using static cordons or 
containment tactics can be lawful if the above tests are met; entailing that preventative action 
short of arrest taken against those not actively involved in the imminent breach of the peace 
(the more peaceable group, that is) may also be lawful in the same specific context. 
A key examination of the tensions inherent in the qualified rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11 
ECHR took place in the case of Redmond-Bate v DPP (2000) 7 BHRC 375, which followed 
soon after the creation of the Human Rights Act 1998, and was a chance for a new emphasis 
on the role of the ECHR in balancing the duty of preserving public order and allowing the 
exercise of freedom of expression in public places. The case featured an unlawful arrest for 
breach of the peace; since those who were acting in a disorderly manner in response to 
religious preaching outside Wakefield Cathedral should have been those to be arrested for 
creating an imminent or actual breach of the peace, not the preachers themselves.  Arresting 
the preachers was for the police officers concerned a way of removing the potential for 
disorder 'at source'.  Redmond-Bate serves as a twin reminder of principle: firstly and simply, 
that proper regard must be had to freedom of expression in carrying out the policing of 
protest and public order; while secondly, that sometimes the harder operational choice is the 
correct, lawful path for the police to take, and the decision may have to be made to allow the 
source of a disturbance of public order to continue (lawfully) expressing themselves. 
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These twin principles from Redmond-Bate do not sit easily with the recent decision of the UK 
Supreme Court in the case of R (Hicks) v Metropolitan Police [2017] UKSC 9, concerning 
the preventative arrest of several individuals for imminent breaches of the peace, prior to 
protests in London held to coincide with the 'Royal' wedding of William Wales and Katherine 
Middleton (as she then was)
52
.  
In Hicks, the Supreme Court ruled that necessary arrests for an imminent breach of the peace 
may be reasonable and proportionate even if they are undertaken with a view to releasing an 
individual before they are charged, taken together with possible burdens on police resources 
in dealing with large volumes of protestors arrested for (imminent) breaches of the peace. 
Toulson LJ noted in Hicks (at para. 36) that:  
"It would be perverse if it were the law that in such circumstances, in order to be 
lawfully able to detain the person so as to prevent their imminently committing an 
offence, the police must harbour a purpose of continuing the detention, after the risk 
had passed, until such time as the person could be brought before a court with a view 
to being bound over to keep the peace in future. This would lengthen the period of 
detention and place an unnecessary burden on court time and police resources."  
The Supreme Court also determined that a purposive approach to removing a (potentially) 
problematic protester from the streets for several hours, with no ultimate goal of pursuing a 
conviction, is no procedural breach of Article 5 ECHR (the right to liberty and security of the 
person). In his unanimous judgment in Hicks in the Supreme Court, Toulson LJ wrote that 
(paras. 29 and 30): 
"[29] The fundamental principle underlying article 5 is the need to protect the 
individual from arbitrary detention, and an essential part of that protection is timely 
judicial control, but at the same time article 5 must not be interpreted in such a way as 
would make it impracticable for the police to perform their duty to maintain public 
order and protect the lives and property of others. These twin requirements are not 
contradictory but complementary… [30] In balancing these twin considerations it is 
necessary to keep a grasp of reality and the practical implications. Indeed, this is 
central to the principle of proportionality, which is not only embedded in article 5 but 
is part of the common law relating to arrest for breach of the peace." 
The Supreme Court in Hicks was very much concerned with the realities and practicalities of 
public order policing in challenging circumstances (paras. 31 and 40): 
"[31] In this case there was nothing arbitrary about the decisions to arrest, detain and 
release the appellants. They were taken in good faith and were proportionate to the 
situation. If the police cannot lawfully arrest and detain a person for a relatively short 
time (too short for it to be practical to take the person before a court) in circumstances 
where this is reasonably considered to be necessary for the purpose of preventing 
imminent violence, the practical consequence would be to hamper severely their 
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ability to carry out the difficult task of maintaining public order and safety at mass 
public events. This would run counter to the fundamental principles previously 
identified… [40] There are also practical considerations. The police may find it 
necessary to take action to prevent an imminent breach of the peace in circumstances 
where there is not sufficient time to give a warning. An example might be a football 
match where two unruly groups collide and the police see no alternative but to detain 
them, or the ringleaders on both sides, immediately for what may be quite a short 
time." 
A crucial issue for the police force dealing with a Rotherham-type situation of far-right 
protest and counter-protests that,  according to intelligence, are more than likely to grow 
disorderly and violent during their course, is the need to consider how a strategic approach 
might be informed by human rights law and ECHR rights of both protestors and the local 
community. So how might a police force best structure and plan their approach to using 
statutory approaches to regulating what they know will be, on the basis of their risk 
assessment models and their intelligence analysis, a protest engendering some degree, or a 
great amount of public disorder? What rationale should most centrally inform the use of 
conditions on processions and assemblies, where necessary, under the Public Order Act 1986, 
say - or the use of dispersal powers and civil injunctions, as noted above, if the relevant 
criteria are met using provisions of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014? 
The common law on arrests and actions short of arrest with a view to preventing or curtailing 
breaches of the peace, places an understandable and vital emphasis on the imminence of the 
potential breach of the peace concerned. Bu how best to take proportionate prior steps, which 
are still conscious of finite resources, to have the best chance of actually precluding any 
imminent risk of a breach of the peace? 
South Yorkshire Police, as has been explained above, are faced with the difficult task of  
either adequately 'facilitating' the protest of (what their past experience and garnered 
intelligence has shown to be) violent far-right groups, or running the risk of judicial criticism 
of their failure to uphold Article 10 and 11 'packaged' rights of protest. As such, the force 
responsible for the safety and wellbeing of all communities in Rotherham might well 
welcome some elements of the unanimous judgment of the UK Supreme Court in the recent 
decision of R (DB) v Police Service of Northern Ireland [2017] UKSC 7. 
7. A reminder in DB of the importance of other qualified ECHR rights 
In something of a re-balancing act, Lord Kerr has recently given a judgment in DB which 
suggests Articles 10 and 11 ECHR would not entail a requirement to 'facilitate' any type of 
sufficiently illegal protest (that is, perhaps, protest in some way in breach of conditions under 
Section 12 or 14 of the 1986 Act in England and Wales). In DB itself, the illegal protests 
under analysis had been a parade in Northern Ireland that had taken place without the 
required permission of the Parades Commission. In going ahead in an atmosphere of hostility, 
sectarianism and harassment, these parades had sufficiently interfered with the right to resect 
for private and family life of local residents in a Nationalist area, through which the Unionists 
had been passing, to the extent that DB should have been able, in the view of the Supreme 
  
Court justices, to rely on the positive obligation of the police to protect their Article 8 ECHR 
rights by better controlling and even preventing the repeated parades.  
Furthermore, there was a strong suggestion from the UK Supreme court in DB that the 
positive obligations to protect the Article 8 ECHR rights of bystanders/the local community 
may be more important than contrasting rights of protest, depending on the circumstances. As 
Lord Kerr explains in the text of his (unanimously supported) judgment (para. 62): 
“The parades in this case were far from peaceful. The police had no obligation to 
facilitate them. To the contrary, they had an inescapable duty to prevent, where 
possible, what were plainly illegal parades from taking place and to protect those 
whose rights under article 8 of ECHR were in peril of being infringed. Meeting those 
obligations had to be tempered by operational constraints, of course. Stopping the 
parades without taking account of what further violence that might provoke was not 
an option. But the operational difficulties required to be assessed in the correct legal 
context.”  
What was so 'plainly illegal' (in the words of Lord Kerr) about the parades in DB in any 
event? The difference is that everyone taking part in an un-notified parade in Northern 
Ireland commits an offence, while only the organisers of a qualifying procession in England 
and Wales commits an offence if no notification occurs under the requirements of Section 11 
of the Public Order Act 1986.  As Lord Kerr explained in DB (at para. 9): 
"A key part of the scheme of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998] was 
that control of parades would be achieved by conditions imposed by the commission. 
In order for that vital element to work, a statutory duty (section 6(1)) was placed on 
those proposing to organise a public procession to give advance notice of that 
proposal to a member of the police force. By section 6(7) it was made a criminal 
offence to organise or to take part in a public procession which had not been 
notified. It was also an offence to fail to comply with any conditions imposed. None 
of the flags parades in Belfast was notified to the commission." [Emphasis added.] 
And what of plainly 'far from peaceful' marches in Rotherham by the EDL, or Britain first, or 
any other far-right group? If the procession concerned was embarked upon without the 
statutorily required notice period of six days (if this were reasonably practicable), or if the 
conditions placed upon the procession by police under the Public Order Act 1986, according 
to the relevant criteria, were actually breached, in a manner where the organisers were 
responsible, then what? There is probably a distinction to be made first of all, as to the 
distinction between the non-notification offence committed by organisers of a procession 
alone, and something like the offence committed by all those who knowingly breach 
conditions placed upon an assembly, say, under the 1986 Act. 
As the Adapting to Protest - Nurturing the British Model of Policing report published by 
HMIC explained in 2009: "An organiser of a procession may commit a criminal offence 
  
under the Public Order Act 1986 in failing to notify the police of a public procession but this 
alone does not justify an infringement of ECHR Article 11…"53, and in addition: 
 
"The Public Order Act 1986 requires organisers to give advance written notice to the 
police of any proposal to hold a public procession, unless it is not reasonably practical 
to do so.
 
A breach of the notification requirement in section 11 of the Public Order 
Act does not render a protest ‘unlawful’ under the Public Order Act 1986 or mean that 
an otherwise peaceful procession falls outside the ambit of ECHR Article 11. Firstly, 
the section applies only to public processions and not to other assemblies. Secondly, it 
does not make criminal the mere participation in such a procession: only the 
organisers will commit an offence."
54
 
 
However, as cited in DB by Lord Kerr at para. 60, the Strasbourg Court noted in Molnar v 
Hungary (Application 10346/05) at para. 37 that the idea that Article 11 ECHR requires the 
facilitation of un-notified protests (and in the UK context, specifically un-notified 
processions): 
"cannot be extended to the point that the absence of prior notification can never be a 
legitimate basis for crowd dispersal. Prior notification serves not only the aim of 
reconciling, on the one hand, the right to assembly and, on the other hand, the rights 
and lawful interests (including the right of movement) of others, but also the 
prevention of disorder or crime. In order to balance these conflicting interests, the 
institution of preliminary administrative procedures is common practice in member 
states when a public demonstration is to be organised. In the Court’s view, such 
requirements do not, as such, run counter to the principles embodied in article 11 of 
the Convention, as long as they do not represent a hidden obstacle to the freedom of 
peaceful assembly protected by the Convention…" 
Weighing non-notification in the balance as a single factor amongst several in deciding to use 
common law powers to take 'action short of arrest' in curtailing a procession that, on the basis 
of police intelligence applied in good faith, presents a risk of public disorder, violence and a 
breach of the peace, is a stance which would be the subject of a subsequent claim for judicial 
review by protestors. But the very existence of judicial review as a safeguard, along with 
requirements to be met in putting conditions on an assembly or procession, or the restraints 
on the use of statutory powers  to give dispersal orders, might actually sufficiently secure and 
render lawful, in a systemic sense, the decision of the police to interfere with Article 11 
ECHR rights in such an eventuality. To draw on the phrasing of David Mead, such a clear 
weighing of competing interests that includes non-notification/non-authorisation in that 
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balancing exercise "does not normally encroach unnecessarily on the right" found in Article 
11 ECHR, for example
55
. 
Of course it is important to recognise that on-notification might only be a single factor in a 
balancing exercise, say between Article 8 versus 10 and 11 ECHR rights. As David Mead has 
reminded us on this point, Section 11 of the 1986 Act only creates a criminal offence for 
individuals involved in organising a procession that is not notified to the police (unlike the 
legislation for Northern Ireland as discussed above), and so it is wrong to talk of inherently 
unlawful marches and so on
56
. But there is something qualitatively different about the risk of 
violence and disorder that may arise if a group of protestors do not follow the conditions set 
down upon their protest under Section 12 or Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
In terms of a severity of a breach of the law, if Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 
1998offences help to make the parades in DB 'plainly illegal', would the 'knowing' breach of a 
S.12 or S.14 POA 1986 condition by a majority of a group of demonstrators render a protest 
in England 'plainly illegal' in the same way? These offences can be committed by both the 
organisers and the participants in a procession (S.12(4) and (5)), and at an assembly (S.14(4) 
and (5)). As the Adapting to Protest - Nurturing the British Model of Policing report notes:  
"Of course, if lawful restrictions have been imposed on the right to peaceful assembly 
in accordance with ECHR Article 11(2) (for example, in accordance with sections 12 
or 14 of the Public Order Act 1986), it will not be a lawful exercise of the right to 
peaceful assembly to fail to comply with those restrictions."
57
 
Proportionality is of course key. Procedural non-compliance by protestors may create only 
tokenistic criminal liability - while outrageous breaches of conditions lawfully imposed on 
protestors under the 1986 Act could result in the most serious disorder and harm. So there 
must be a careful application of contextual factors in police commander decision making. The 
approach by the courts to formulating a test on proportionality assists police commanders in 
this regard. Reflecting the now-standard four-part proportionality test adopted in case law 
from the UK Supreme Court, the Adapting to Protest - Nurturing the British Model of 
Policing report has it that:  
"The principle of proportionality requires that:  
(i) the purpose is sufficiently important to justify the restriction;  
 
(ii) the means chosen are rationally connected to that purpose;  
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(iii) other less restrictive means would not be as effective in achieving that purpose; and  
 
(iv) a fair balance must be maintained between the rights of the individual and the general 
interest of the community."
58
 
Contextual factors will abound in the notion of what is, and what could be said not to be a 
'fair balance' in taking actions short of arrest' in the face of an imminent breach of the peace, 
for example. What about the length of the 'unlawfulness' of the protest? Mr Justice Males in 
Sheffield City Council v Fairhill and Others [2017] EWHC 2121 (QB) at para. 88 writes 
clearly and usefully that:  
 
"…the lawfulness of a protest may change with time. In some circumstances it will be 
impossible to justify a restriction on freedom of expression or freedom of peaceful 
assembly which is of limited duration, even if it involves conduct which is tortious or 
which amounts to a criminal offence, and even if the conduct in question affects 
adversely the rights of others or – as in this case – prevents others from going about 
their lawful business. That is something which public authorities and others may have 
to put up with in view of the importance of these rights in a democratic society. 
However, a protest which starts as a legitimate exercise of Article 10 or 11 rights may 
become unlawful if it continues for a more extended period. The more serious the 
tortious or criminal conduct in question and the greater the impact on the rights of 
others, the shorter the period is likely to be before the initially legitimate protest 
becomes unlawful."  
 
When Males J uses the term 'unlawful' to apply to protest here, he can really be taken to mean 
a protest which should no longer be respected and indeed facilitated by the police, on the 
grounds that in a legitimate, reasonable and proportionate basis there is a pressing need for an 
interference by the police with the package of Article 10 and 11 ECHR rights as being 
exercised by demonstrators.  
Lord Kerr notes that another factor to be weighed in the balance would be the likelihood of 
any violence or disorder if a procession or march were to be stopped entirely. But here we 
must bear in mind the differences in potential risk over flashpoints between two (still, sadly 
sometimes very) divided communities in Belfast, say, and the situation of inflammatory, 
repeated visits by a few hundred far-right protestors to the heart ordinarily peaceable 
community of tens of thousands in Rotherham. However, even saying this, South Yorkshire 
Police are under political and social pressures to be all things; facilitators of protest and 
guardians of public safety. The courts would surely afford them some latitude if they acted 
with tolerance with regard to continued far-right protests targeting Rotherham, even where 
there might be a lawful case for more rigorous intervention and treatment of a right-wing 
group, since the situation in Rotherham has been pretty unique, outside of Northern Ireland, 
in the last several years. As the European Court of Human Rights observed in P.F. and E.F. v. 
the United Kingdom (2010) no. 28326/09 at para. 41:                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
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"... the police must be afforded a degree of discretion in taking operational decisions. 
Such decisions are almost always complicated and the police, who have access to 
information and intelligence not available to the general public, will usually be in the 
best position to make them." 
8. Conclusion 
It can be first concluded that following the recent case law developments such DB, and the 
added powers to regulate and control risk over public disorder, using newer statutory 
approaches concerning dispersal powers and civil injunctions, from the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014
59
, then police all over the UK have grounds for a 
strategic re-assessment of the manner in which the rights of expression and assembly of far-
right groups engaging in public protest work in practice, as against the right to respect for 
private and family life of members of the local community, as impacted upon by the protests 
concerned.  
Nothing may change in terms of specific police policy, as the newest case law is on subtle 
points of law, and fairly recent legislative changes are not a grand scheme of reform but 
tweaks to sets of pre-existing police powers overall. But police forces in the UK, and 
certainly South Yorkshire Police, might learn lessons from a reconsideration of the recent 
legal changes in their professional development and training of public order commander-level 
officers. 
It may well be that in future there is no need for the spread of bodies such as the Rotherham 
Advisory Panel on Protests to continue around other parts of England and Wales. This may 
be no bad thing - as Rotherham is a specific case stud of sorts, with its own context - and 
given the concerns that might be raised over potential anti-protest bias and the politicisation 
of the policing of protest that such a panel might engender. But in Rotherham the Panel may 
continue to have a place for its work, particularly given matters of equality law that apply to 
the work of the police in South Yorkshire, in the form of strands of the public sector equality 
duty. The evidence that the model of the Panel is a useful tool for upholding the rights to 
protest, along with assuaging community concerns that the right to peaceful respect for 
private and family life is being protected, is yet to be overwhelming, but would be very 
welcome indeed. 
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